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This article examines the historical origins of civil
liberties and shows their importance to systems of
government rooted in the principles of representative
democracy. It argues that the subject of civil liberties
needs to be distinguished from issues related to criminal
justice and human rights, and that too broad a
deployment of the language of civil liberties can lead to
the importance of civil liberties being underappreciated
by the wider public. The article considers how the
integrity of the language of civil liberties and the
representative system of democracy as a whole can be
preserved in the face of the strong challenge to these
values that has become increasingly apparent since the
9/11 attacks.
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I. THE PROBLEM DEFINED
The critical perspective that we bring to the present state of the law,
or to this or that proposal for change, is formed in large part by our
understanding of what we, as a political society, are committed to, and of
what we believe ourselves to be capable. This set of expectations is in turn
made possible by the kind of institutional structure within which we, as
active citizens, find ourselves. The better our framework, the more open it
claims to be, the more justice it delivers, then the more critical we are of
decisions that, to our eyes, involve departures from what we believe the
system to be capable of achieving, and from what, furthermore, we think it
ought to provide. Hence, the great disappointments are always suffered by
egalitarian campaigners in democratic systems, not only under occasional
reactionary administrations but under left-wing and social democratic ones
as well. Enough is never done because enough can never be done (short of
the achievement of an egalitarian revolution that the twentieth century has
taught us will produce, at best, a brief mirage of progress, and, at worst,
unnecessary bloodshed and counter-reaction).
The fate of the socialist-minded activist in modern democratic
politics is that of the perpetual bemoaner, lamenting the reactionary zeal
of the Right or the betrayals of the governing Left, as the case may be. Even
when progress is acknowledged to be evident, it is inevitably condemned by
such critics as too little, too late, or (even worse) as a token morsel thrown
down to put them off the scent. The tone of politics on the Left in
contemporary democracy is routinely one of doom and gloom, of betrayal
and anger, rather than of optimism and pragmatic policy ambition. Such
language is at odds with the sunnier idealism with which socialist ideas
started and neither is it particularly appealing at election time. The
attraction of the third way to very successful left-leaning politicians like Bill
Clinton and Tony Blair lies in the way it has allowed them to escape the
negative rhetoric of their political heartlands without formally entering the
enemy's right-wing territory. The goal of democratic success in the societies
in which they have found themselves has necessitated that both men switch
away from their respective political bases-the bastions of the left-wing
political activists with their dreams of equality and their constant
disappointments-towards a middle ground populated by a quite different
sort of person, one with much more run-of-the-mill ambitions for the state
and for what it can and should do for those within its jurisdiction.
These people, and there are far more of them than there are
political enthusiasts of any sort, have a different set of assumptions about
the framework of government than those of the actively involved and, as a
result, their critical perspective on what can and cannot be achieved will
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often be very different from that of the engaged political player. And
because many of these individuals vote, it is their version of achievability,
of what is to be expected, of what emancipatory initiatives should be
undertaken, that really counts. This is frustrating for the political activist
who is involved in agitation, meetings, and planning around the clock, such
being their nature. It is also annoying for the thinker who has sat quietly in
his or her office and worked out exactly why equality is a moral imperative.
Why should the version of the possible to which the activist and the scholar
have come be usurped by these once-every-four-years citizens? It may be
democracy and they are stuck with it, they know that. But they cannot help
accusing their own leadership of letting them down, of even betraying them
when (in the hope of re-election) that leadership notices these whimsical
occasional citizens, who may only vote every four years but who read the
papers and form judgments everyday. The disappointments of the Left flow
from the minority status of its emancipatory horizon of expectation, which
in turn results from its ambitious and (other than at the level of woolly
rhetoric) self-defeatingly sectional view of both how effectively to construct
an association of free and equal citizens and which policies to promulgate
within such a body.
The area of civil liberties provides an extreme example of this
dissonance between persons who are politically engaged (usually on the
Left), on the one hand, and the general population, on the other. Few
subjects excite the political activist, the liberal, and the concerned lawyer
more than the need to protect civil liberties. The term is frequently called
into action as a shield against governmental proposals for change in a wide
range of areas, such as police powers, criminal justice, prisons, terrorism,
public order, criminal procedure, data protection, surveillance, and identity
cards. Indeed there are many others; civil liberties has become a catch-all
phrase, denoting many kinds of conduct that may not self-evidently seem
to engage the term but that have been dragged within its remit by
government attack. Where privacy is concerned, often there is not even any
individual behaviour involved, but rather some part of a person, such as
voice, genetic code, or blood, that it is considered necessary to protect from
the state. Organizations deeply rooted in civil society devote themselves to
the protection of civil liberties, the subject being defined in this reactive
way. Lawyers' associations are usually also committed in the same manner.
There is rarely talk of "the enhancement of civil liberties" with a
consequent need for focus on and discrimination as to what the term
entails. As a result of this reactive nature, the effort of identification and
definition only rarely arises; a civil liberty becomes known by the fact of a
government attack upon it.
20031
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL.41, NOS. 2 & 3
It may be because of this openness of meaning that the language of
civil liberties is so often deployed against so many proposals for action by
the state, but the truth would seem to be that the wider community does
not invariably show the same solicitude for civil liberties that is revealed so
persistently and so frequently by the political activist, the liberal
intellectual, and the public lawyer. Seats in parliament do not usually
depend on a representative's voting record on civil liberties. Nor do the
opinion polls punish politicians for making proposals condemned as
invasions of our civil liberties. Indeed, the opposite may even be the case;
such criticisms have the entirely counterproductive effect of causing the
electorate to believe that the government might indeed be on to something
worthwhile, concerning drug control, for example, or serious crime or anti-
social behaviour. Having been condemned consistently by civil liberties
groups for his cavalier approach to freedom, U.K. Home Secretary David
Blunkett was nevertheless rated the third most popular member of the
British cabinet in a poll taken shortly after the 2003 attack on Iraq began.2
His rating remained exactly as it had been a year before, notwithstanding
the enactment in the interim of draconian anti-terrorism legislation that
excited the indignation of civil libertarian activists as few bills have in recent
years.
There is something almost stylized about the way that civil
libertarian issues feed into the modern political discourse. A proposal is
presented by a government minister on crime, immigration, terrorism, or
some other contemporary issue. It is then attacked by the civil liberties
lobby as was to be expected, indeed (for reasons mentioned above),
perhaps as was even thought politically desirable by the minister. This or
that change may or may not then be made, dependent on the strength of
the "lobby" in the individual case. There is no particular sense of the civil
libertarian perspective being integral to the debate, other than to the extent
that the minister is satisfied that the measures being proposed do not
unacceptably erode civil liberties. Such assertions are invariably made, with
ministers rarely denying that civil liberties matter, instead claiming that civil
liberties concerns have been "fully taken into account" (or some such
phrase). What are not fully or (sometimes) even partially regarded are the
views of the primary defenders of civil liberties, the activist non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and lawyers dedicated to their
protection from government abuse. These defenders of civil liberties have
become something akin to the trucking association or consumer groups: no
more than a hurdle that occasionally lies in the way of enactment of
2 Alan Travis, "War Makes Hoon, Straw Cabinet Stars" The Guardian (23 April 2003) 1.
Reflections on Civil Liberties
legislation that may be hard or easy to get by depending on the particular
issue.
In its modern form, the protection of civil liberties has become the
work of a lobby, not the duty of the entire citizenry, whose claim to act on
behalf of the whole of society is not shared by this wider audience; indeed
the general public is far more likely to see the civil liberties crowd less as
the defenders of their own freedom, and more as the shop stewards of
thieves, terrorists, and "fat cat" lawyers. This is an attitude that is
frequently encouraged by government. Sometimes even deeper, politically
motivated hatred is directed at civil libertarians. The attacks on the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in the United States have
sometimes reached a pitch of hostility reminiscent of the Cold War era, as
when Presidential Candidate Michael Dukakis was forced to defend his
membership of the organization in the 1980s. In the United Kingdom,
recent Labour Home Secretaries have been able to use their authority in a
movement traditionally committed to civil liberties as a platform for serious
efforts to distinguish the protection of civil liberties (to which they as
ministers say they are and remain committed) from the ostensible
protectors of those same freedoms (who are described as self-serving or
fanatical or as "not living in the real world").'
The world-changing events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) have had
their own large effect on the traditional discourse of civil liberties, piling
further pressure on the term, connecting it once more with anti-patriotic
elements and widening still further the division between the popular and
the liberal/activist perceptions of what the protection of civil liberty entails.
This disconnect was already evident by the time of the attacks on the Twin
Towers, the Pentagon, and United Airlines Flight 93 over Pennsylvania; it
was not generated by those events. What is new about the era that has been
ushered in by 9/11, however, has been the willingness of individuals within
the leadership in certain democratic states to deepen further their hostility
to the language of civil liberties, to open up a new front in their assault on
the liberal/activist understanding of the phrase by asking publicly whether
now is the right the time to give up on civil liberties altogether, at least
insofar as certain suspect groups and perhaps also other undesirables are
concerned. Since 9/11, the debate regarding civil liberties is no longer
entirely about who protects civil liberties better, the politician or the civil
3The phrase is that of the United Kingdom's Home Secretary David Blunkett, used in May 2003
in the course of a speech rebutting criticisms of certain legislative proposals from a retired senior judge:
see John Steele, "Blunkett takes swipe at judges" The Daily Telegraph (15 May 2003), online: Telgraph
News <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/05/15/nblunkl5.xml> (date
accessed: 21 July 2003).
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libertarian; instead, it is increasingly about whether the civil liberties of
certain groups can afford to be taken into account at all. This is a dramatic
and relatively new twist, the first breach (in the democratic era outside of
formal war at least) in a previously unqualified (at least rhetorically)
commitment to the equal protection of the laws, and an indication perhaps
of future assaults on the whole idea of civil liberties by a rival discourse
rooted exclusively in concerns of national security and counterterrorism.4
The danger inherent in these developments (both pre- and post-
9/11) for the activist or civil libertarian position simply cannot be
exaggerated. If current trends continue, such citizens will find that the
rhetorical and indeed practically-expressed priorities that they believe have
been taken for granted for generations will be turned on their head: where
there was freedom, there will now be security; where there was individual
liberty, there will henceforth be the interests of the state; where there was
due process, there will be almost casual executive discretion; and so on ad
nauseam. The civil libertarian who persists in using the traditional language
will cease not only to be at odds with the prevailing, more community-
minded point of view, but will also become merely eccentric, of historical
interest perhaps, a curiosity certainly, and irrelevant. The traditional
Liberal's language kit will be full of tired metaphors redolent of a past era,
while those who count-those who tell the police what to do and arrange
the detention camps and the telephone intercepts, sanction the torture and
so on-will have the renewed freshness of phraseology that flows from a
rejuvenation of fear. The civil libertarian will become like the jaded priest
clinging to homilies reminiscent of an age long past.
The major shift in language described above is not yet complete.
The idea of civil liberties still carries some resonance not only with the
liberal activists, but also with the wider community and with some political
leaders. Behind the times as always, certain judicial cultures are only now
developing strong civil libertarian perspectives (the American judicial
culture, having been earlier in the civil libertarian game, are closer to the
exit than the rest). There is still a sense of the idea of civil liberties being in
conflict with more modern needs such as for national (or homeland)
security, rather than having been wholly vanquished by such needs. It is still
possible that a catastrophic overreach of state power (a guerilla-war defeat
for U.S. forces in Iraq; a failed invasion; a pre-emptive attack on North
Korea that goes wrong; U.S. economic collapse) or some monstrous
overplaying of the anti-civil libertarian hand (mass detention; the careless
use of torture) might reconfigure the political landscape so as to permit the
4 A new perspective that has been able to build on the distinction between the resident or citizen
and the non-resident or alien which has, to some extent, always been in the law.
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re-emergence and reassertion of the traditional language. However, the
more likely eventuality at the time of writing is a continuation of the slow
and inexorable decline in the traditional idea of what is entailed by civil
liberties, the continuation of its marginalization, and its eventual
replacement by the new security paradigm.
In order to fight back effectively, something that (we have to
believe) is still possible even at this late stage, proponents of civil liberties
must develop a much clearer intellectual strategy than has been evident in
the past. This strategy should be rooted in a proper understanding of the
historical origins of the term, and should also express a clear view as to
what civil liberties does (and, more to the point, does not) encompass.
Slimmed down and historically aware, a new revitalized and confident
language of civil liberties need not go down without a fight: we owe that at
least to those generations of past activists without whose struggles we would
have nothing now to defend.
II. THE ORIGINS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
Our first task is to clarify the terms that we are using. Let us begin
by asserting that the heyday of civil liberties, the moment in time when this
version of freedom imposed itself on the historical imagination, occurred
in England in the seventeenth century. It was during the last decades of this
period that the liberty and freedom (both in the broadest sense) of property
owners were successfully asserted against the absolutist inclinations of the
Stuart monarchy. After a few, quasi-democratic turnings that led nowhere,
the constitutional settlement of 1688 eventually emerged, securing property
owners the enjoyment of freedom and liberty in general, and the civil
liberties that came with such freedom in particular: namely the right to vote
for representatives in the sovereign parliament and the ancillary rights of
expression and assembly that went with, and made meaningful, that right
to vote. The connection between civil liberties and freedom at the abstract
level of political theory was made very early, and the link between civil
liberties and parliamentary sovereignty was likewise present at the birth of
civil liberties in their modem form. The power of the phrase lay in its ability
both to reach up into the clouds of abstract philosophy and, at the same
time, down into the fields of pragmatic constitution-building (as we would
call it today).
During the nineteenth century, there was a marked expansion of the
categories of holders of cvil liberties in what today we would call the old
2003]
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democracies.' During this period, the right to vote was extended beyond
the property-owning men to men generally and then to women as well. The
ancillary freedoms of liberty, expression, association, and assembly during
this time also came to be enjoyed by a far wider set of persons than had
previously been the case, with a climate of official tolerance gradually
replacing the atmosphere of repression with which the period began. From
being an essential tool in the elite's government in its own interest, civil
liberties gradually emerged as an entitlement available to be claimed by all,
and to the protection of which it was thought governments and other
components of civil society ought to be dedicated.
How did these changes come about? Each political environment
has its own story to tell. As far as Britain is concerned, the advances of the
seventeenth century were secured via what we would call today civil
disobedience (the deliberate, principled breach of a law judged unjust), but
they also required much more than this, embracing what we would now
describe as terrorism (the indiscriminate killing of civilians or assaults on
their property practised by subversive elements in order to communicate a
message to government or to secure an advantage over the authorities) and
military-style insurgency (attacks by organized subversive forces on the
political and military authorities of the day). Because rival armies
eventually took to the field, the conflict in seventeenth-century England
also embraced civil war without resorting to the intervening stage of
guerrilla warfare. After the radical changes of the 1690s, there were fairly
robust coalitions of interests determined to obtain for themselves the civil
liberties that earlier generation of revolutionaries had secured for the
propertied. Realizing these ambitions required action on the streets and in
the printing presses. There were lots of crowds shouting slogans and
threatening revolution, assembling where they should not have done, and,
generally (from the legal point of view), making criminal nuisances of
themselves.
A brisk survey of the period will find plenty of examples of civil
disobedience, direct action, and even terrorism. There was, of course,
conventional parliamentary engagement as well, such as the reform
legislation passed in Britain in 1832 and 1867. These various techniques of
securing change were, in their nineteenth-century context, certainly about
many things, but from the perspective of this article it is worth noting that
5 For the present purposes we will define the nineteenth century as the Age of Democratization
that extends from 1789 (French Revolution) to the general emergence of the universal franchise in the
West (to use the term loosely) in the aftermath of the First World War. For a more extensive discussion
of civil liberties see K.D. Ewing & C.A. Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and the
Rule of Law in Britain, 1914-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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they were at least partly about achieving a situation of general respect for
civil liberties; civil liberties were the end, not the means to the end, as the
other forms of action (terrorism, civil disobedience, and civil war) had been
in the seventeenth century and were in the nineteenth. These other tools of
political change were mechanisms for securing outcomes rather than-as
was the case with civil liberties-efforts to achieve agreed democratic
procedures for change. This important difference may explain why,
historically, the Right has shared (in a frustratingly ill-defined, inconsistent,
almost whimsical, romantic kind of way) the Left's attachment to civil
liberties. The origins of the subject are deeply conservative: it is about
joining the status quo, not subverting it.
Thus it was during this age of democratization that the meaning of
civil liberties emphasized not the creation or enhancement of these
freedoms, but rather the need for them to be accorded respect and
protection. The subject was not about fabricating something wholly new;
instead, it was about sharing out among the many something that was
already available to the few. What then was that "something"? Clearly the
right to vote was the first essential requirement. As for the ancillary
freedoms of liberty, expression, association, and assembly, those seeking
respect for their civil liberties (among a mixture of other goals) during this
period were not demanding that they be given these rights in the way they
were demanding the right to vote. Rather, they were insisting that they be
allowed to exercise these rights without state interference. They wanted to
protest without being shot and to publish political pamphlets without being
jailed. It is true that certain laws, against combinations, for example, or
sedition, might well have been regarded by nineteenth-century radicals as
irredeemably bad. But we can guess that the democratic agitators and union
activists of the time would not have been conscious of calling for the
abolition of all the laws that were deployed against them: those of trespass,
breach of the peace, unlawful assembly, and binding over. It is more likely
that to the extent that they thought about it at all, they believed it was
necessary to have some public order law on the books. It was more a case
of seeking to ensure that these laws were no longer exercised in a way that
effectively destroyed their civil liberties.
This is a key point of principle. Under the traditional British system,
theoretically everyone had these ancillary civil liberties, except insofar as
they were removed by the operation of law. In practice, however, because
the law extended so widely, a group's or an individual's civil liberties could
be effectively extinguished by the hostile exercise of official discretion, if
the authorities chose to act antagonistically. When we understand this point
we can see why the subject of civil liberties so often resolves itself into a
study of official discretion: consider the British and Irish cases of Beatty v.
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Gillbanks,6 O'Kelly v. Harvey and Duncan v. Jones.8 All three of these
decisions involved not just the police and magistrates deciding to break up
a hostile gathering: there was an element of pre-planning on both sides,
especially in Duncan v. Jones. The law on the protection of civil liberties
involves analysis of the hostile exercise of official discretion on the spot as
it were. It also involves study of the hostile exercise of such discretion,
provoked by the peaceful action of persons intent on asserting their civil
liberties: Mrs. Jones outside the training centre, Mr. O'Kelly at his meeting,
and Captain Beatty and his team of Salvationists. Here the subject of civil
liberties comes very close to that of civil disobedience. The latter is about
the principled defiance of a law judged unjust; these cases are about the
principled defiance of an unjust exercise of a discretion under a law that
might in itself not be regarded as unjust.
We should now briefly summarize what we have been saying so far.
First, civil liberties are those freedoms that are necessary to the proper
functioning of a decision-making assembly designed on the representative
principle (the right to vote, the freedoms of speech, assembly, and
association). Second, though pre-democratic in its origin, the concept of
civil liberties was ideally suited to the democratic era: the wider the range
of persons entitled to representation, the more the civil liberties of the
propertied few became the "rights" of the many. Third, civil liberties
facilitate an effective system of representative government; they are not
about achieving any particular political outcome; they differ, therefore,
from forms of political agitation (civil disobedience, terrorism, military
insurgency) that are extra-parliamentary in nature and that are invariably
driven by a commitment to policy outcomes rather than procedural
integrity. Fourth, while the subject of civil liberties does involve the
imposition of certain positive obligations on the state (mainly related to the
right to vote and the prevention of disruption of the civil liberties of others
by private parties), it is primarily concerned with ensuring that there is no
inappropriate interference by the state with those civil liberties (expression
and assembly, for example) that are essential both to the proper exercise of
that right to vote and to the political activity that occurs all the time in a
democracy, whether or not a vote is in the offing. Fifth, the subject is, as a
result of all that we have said, more narrowly defined than is commonly
assumed; criminal justice, for example, should be regarded as outside the
remit of civil liberties proper, as should prison law and police powers
6 (1882), 9 Q.B.D. 308.
7 (1883), 15 Cox C.C. 435.
8 (1935), [1936] 1 K.B. 218.
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generally. It is recognized that all these subjects can impact on civil liberties
to the extent that official discretion, exercisable under these laws, impacts
on the right to vote or the ancillary rights of expression and assembly. Sixth,
and finally, the special case of the right to vote apart, the subject is
primarily about the exercise of official discretion under the law, rather than
about the laws themselves. It follows that what especially interests the civil
libertarian scholar is the practice of civil liberties, what the subject looks
like on the streets rather than on the statute book.
III. THE TAMING OF DEMOCRACY
From this vantage point, we can see that the triumph of democratic
forms also represents a victory for the idea of civil liberties. The two are
inextricably interconnected. Democracy is about ensuring that the
representatives of any given community get to decide what is in the best
interests of that community, with each elector having an equal say in the
outcome of the elections that determine who is to sit in the representative
assembly. Civil liberties are about guaranteeing that equal say. It might
have been thought that the achievement of democracy would have secured
the future of civil liberties for all time, making the current attacks on them
literally impossible to imagine. But that is to underestimate the fragility of
the hold that representative democracy has on our political imagination.
The drift away from a commitment to civil liberties described in the first
part of this article has not come out of nowhere. It is a subset of a wider
and more fundamental corrosion in allegiance to the idea of representative
democracy itself. This weakening of confidence in democracy has made
easier the assaults on civil liberties that have (as we have seen) nearly
completely wrested from it its traditional, democracy-reinforcing meaning.
While at the same time as the language of western-style democracy has
been reaching further and further across the globe, what is entailed by
democracy has been shifting before our eyes, becoming in the traditional
western democracies, more and more about presidential-style, media-
friendly, business-oriented leaders, and in the new democracies being less
and less about process (the right to vote, expression) and more about
outcomes (the "right" kind of market-sensitive policies; the most agreeable
leadership to foreign eyes; Western or U.S. control of vital national assets;
and so on).9
9 The most explicit exponents of this new brand of democracy are to be found in the Project for
the New American Century, which is housed in the American Enterprise Institute, an organization with
very close contact with the present U.S. administration. For a summary of their views see "Where
Next?" NewInternationalist 356 (May 2003) 4, online: <http://newint.org/issue356/currents.htm > (date
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It is not entirely accurate to talk of the corrosion of the democratic
ideal as though there was once a golden age of untrammelled commitment
to the representative paradigm. The victory of the democratic principle was
fragile even at the moment of its achievement and its hold on the twentieth-
century imagination was always precarious. The hatred for democracy
shown by nineteenth-century defenders of the capitalist status quo was
rooted in the assumption that victory for the representative principle was
bound to usher in a transformation of society that was guaranteed to lead
to the extinction of their way of life. This is also what democratic socialists
tended to believe t0 and what the propagandists of democracy maintained.
The people were bound to vote for equality if given equality of voting
power. From the socialist perspective, the problem with this approach lay
in its commitment to process rather than outcomes. We have already noted
that civil liberties have a procedural character that differentiates them from
more outcome-based techniques of securing political change, such as
terrorism or civil disobedience. What mattered about civil liberties was that
the people should have the power to decide; less important was what, in
fact, they chose to mandate their representatives to do.
Through this chink in the nineteenth-century coalition between the
twin forces of socialism and democracy, reactionary elements were able to
mount a brilliant rearguard action, accepting representative democracy in
principle, but at the same time throwing up various smokescreens and
performing innumerable tricks so as to confuse or dazzle the newly
liberated masses onto their side. Some of these manoeuvres were relatively
benign, even beneficial, such as the expansion of welfare provision that was
enacted in many Western states at around the same time. Less attractive
was a new emphasis on imperialism, which in Britain, for example, created
a basis in nationalism for the support that came to be shown by a
substantial number of working-class people for the Conservative Party:
Benjamin Disraeli is still revered by Tory ideologists precisely because he
was the first to see that electoral reform did not necessarily entail the
obliteration of the ruling class.
In the twentieth century, the mechanism for controlling the
optimistic, egalitarian impulses of the democratic ideal has been constituted
out of ingredients that can be described, using a familiar contemporary
metaphor, as both "tough and tender." As far as the latter is concerned, the
concessions initiated by or wrought out of the rich and propertied classes
accessed: 23 June 2003).
See Edward Bernstein, The Preconditions of Socialism, ed. and trans. by Henry Tudor
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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have continued, accelerating after the Russian revolution of 1917 and the
establishment of what, for many years, looked to be a real alternative to
capitalist democracy. Substantial gains have been made, and continue to be
made, for the majority of the people that would not have been available in
the absence of the democratic assertion of the indelibility of the linkage
between political power and the wishes of all those affected by the exercise
of that power. By contrast, the tough side of the new democratic age has
been evident in an emphasis on national security and the need to be ever-
vigilant to protect the democratic system from threats (both external and
internal) to its existence. The tension between these two models of politics,
one taking democracy and equality as its starting point, the other focusing
emphatically on national survival, has been a constant of the democratic
era. The first model is hopeful, oriented towards freedom and civil liberties,
optimistic and confident, inclined towards equality and social justice. The
second is gloomier, more anxious, fearful of the future, and pessimistic
about progress, with no time for ambitious programs or radical reform.
It has been through the language of war that the national security
model has found its clearest expression. In the western democracies, the
world wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45 provided many well-known
opportunities for the evasion of democratic duties, from the postponement
of elections through to the large-scale suspension of civil liberties. More
interesting from the perspective of this article have been the "cold" wars
that have been pursued (waged is perhaps not quite the right word) in times
of peace. There was the "red scare" of the 1920s, the well-known activities
of the McCarthyites, and (to use perhaps an apt term) their fellow travellers
in the United States and abroad during the 1950s. n The actions taken
against Left and socialist groups under the aegis of these various cold wars
in the United States and Britain, but also across the democratic world,
served to rein in the potentially wilder and more excessive enthusiasts of
democracy, without disturbing the democratic ideal to which all were able
to feel they remained committed. The persecution of left-wing activists
simply belonged to a different discourse and therefore did not engage with
the democratic self-image of these states, much less cause embarrassment
to their democracy-loving citizens. The fence that surrounded the
democratic playing field, reducing its space for action, was invisible to most
of those who played the game. Believing themselves to be wholly sovereign,
they did not notice that truly radical ideas never occurred to them; the few
who wandered out of the designated playing area were quickly arrested and
See Samuel Walker, In Defense ofAmerican Liberties:A History of theACLU(New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990).
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expelled from normal politics. Identified as threats to national security, left-
wing activists were denied civil liberties.
The idea of terrorism has been around for a long time and has
served for decades as an adjunct to the national security paradigm. The
British government was able to persuade elected representatives in
parliament to enact harsh anti-civil libertarian measures on the basis of the
threat of Irish-based terrorism in 1939, 1974, 1976, and 1984.12 The last of
these measures, passed when the Cold War had entered what we can now
see as its final phase, extended these powers to encompass international
terrorists, a prescient indicator of how things were to develop. For with the
end of the collapse of Soviet power and the consequent conclusion of the
Cold War, the "terrorist threat" has come into its own as the primary basis
for stifling the natural energy of the democratic ideal. It is not just about
the laws, though these were beginning to come thick and fast well before
9/11, such as legislation in 1996, 1998, and 2000 in Britain, and in 1996 in
the United States, for example." It is also-and primarily perhaps-about
the atmosphere that is engendered in democratic states by the endless talk
of terrorism and the threat it poses to our whole way of life. How can a
community concentrate on bettering its lot when it is constantly worried
about its future? Fear is a great dissipater of political energy that might, if
left alone, be effectively spent elsewhere, on tackling inequality for
example, or on addressing world poverty. At very least, the attacks of 9/11
have served to make this point even more obvious, transforming the idea
of counterterrorism from a residual weapon in a bigger war into a full-scale,
self-standing, and permanent War on Terrorism, capable of being waged
against visible and invisible enemies, in different ways as policy demands,
and without the need for very much action on the enemy side. 4 For those
always searching (consciously or unconsciously, institutionally or
12 C.A. Gearty & J.A. Kimbell, Terrrorism and the Rule of Law: A Report on the Law Relating to
Political Violence in Great Britain and Northern Ireland (London: CLRU, School of Law, King's College,
1995).
See generally on the British side, Clive Walker, Blackstone's Guide to the Anti-Terrorism
Legislation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
14 See on the legislative and political reaction in the United States, Nancy Chang, Silencing
Political Dissent: How Post-September 11 Anti- Terrorism Measures Threaten our Civil Liberties (New York:
Seven Stories Press, 2002) as well as two excellent reports by the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights: "A Year of Loss: Re-examining Civil Liberties Since September 11," online:
<http://www.lchr.orglus._law/loss/loss_main.htm> (date accessed: 19 June 2003) and "Imbalance of
Power: How Changes to U.S. Law and Policy Since 9/11 Erode Human Rights and Civil Liberties,"
online:<http://www.lchr.org/us.lawloss/imbalance/powers.pdf> (date accessed: 19 June 2003).
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individually) for ways to hinder democratic growth, this new war could not
have been more perfectly designed. 5
The battle over the language of civil liberties identified in the
introduction is part of a larger conflict over what the idea of
(representative) democracy entails. The public discourse in all democracies
has invariably involved a tension between, on the one hand, the
egalitarian/activist/liberal model of what democracy can achieve for its
citizenry and, on the other, the national security/"we-are-all-doomed"
paradigm, with its emphasis on survival at all costs. The events of 9/11,
preceeded as they were by an extraordinary judge-made election in the
world's most powerful democracy, have given a firm upper hand to those
whose inclination is to emphasize the need for national security and whose
view of democracy is driven more by the desire for it to deliver certain
outcomes than for its procedure to be clear and fair. Since 9/11, the
language of democracy itself is at risk of being turned into an adjunct to
U.S. foreign policy, emphasizing American-style liberty and freedom rather
than the need for elections and civil liberties. 6 From the perspective of the
civil libertarian wedded to what the phrase used to mean, this is a gloomy
scenario indeed. With the protection traditionally afforded civil liberties by
society's commitment to democracy being washed away before their eyes,
what hope do civil libertarians have of avoiding being drowned in the
subsequent authoritarian deluge?
One big twentieth-century idea that looms large and loud in our
contemporary discourses, achieving more notice than civil liberties
protection has ever managed, has been missing so far from the analysis
presented here. Where do human rights fit in the dismal catalogue of
democratic decline which has just been mapped out in general terms? Was
this not supposed to be the big idea of the post-Cold War age? Where is the
language of human rights when it is most needed?
IV. THE DOUBLE-EDGED PROMISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
In its modem form, the idea of human rights first took root in the
immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Promoted by Franklin
Roosevelt during the war, and given force by the Universal Declaration on
15 Particularly worrying is the development of a U.S. military command for the United States. For
the details see Robert Dreyfuss, "Bringing the War Home: in the name of fighting terrorism, the army
has established a domestic command" The Nation (26 May 2003) 18.
16 See Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003) arguing for a "new
radicalism" and a "liberal American interventionism" to promote "democratic values throughout the
world" (quotations from flyleaf).
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Human Rights, this new language seemed to express well the desire of
humanity to make a fresh start after the horrors of the years just past. As
set out in the Universal Declaration, the range of human rights inherent in
us all is vast, covering basic aspects of our individual dignity, many civil and
political rights, and also a range of social and economic entitlements.17 This
United Nations (UN) document was, of course, intentionally unenforceable,
self-consciously a mission statement for humanity rather than an
immediately realizable set of goals for the people who read it. In their
stronger, judicially-enforceable form, human rights of the immediate post-
war period were narrower in focus, largely restricted to civil and political
rights, or what we have called here civil liberties. The new constitutional
arrangements for the defeated Fascist powers contained rights guarantees
of this sort, and a novel regional co-operative arrangement in Europe (the
Council of Europe) produced a judicially enforceable Convention primarily
concerned with civil and political rights, the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom.
The drafters of these documents, essentially the victors in the
Second World War, were dedicated supporters of democracy, but they were
equally vehement opponents of communism, and indeed of any kind of
radical form of socialism. The link between market freedom and democracy
was in their minds an indelible one. They were therefore faced with the
challenge that the democratic socialists of the nineteenth century had
failed, and with which, for example, the current U.S. regime in Iraq is
wrestling: how do you design a democratic system that always produces the
answer you want? The civil libertarian/human rights charters of the post-
war period provided part of an answer to this when they embraced the right
to property within their remit and (usually) made it impossible for any
legislature, however democratically constituted, to tamper with that right
(other than as was permitted by the qualifications on the guarantee that
were invariably set out in the framework document itself). These basic
human rights documents also generally permitted exceptions to be made to
civil liberties where these were judged to be required to protect the
democratic character of the state. The rights to freedom of expression,
assembly, and association, for instance, can, in most human rights charters
that matter (for instance, those that can bite on conduct at the political
level), be set aside where the executive judges such action to be "necessary
in a democratic society" or some-such phrase. Further exceptions can
frequently be made for public emergencies and the like: a whole scholarship
17 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13,
UN Doc. A/810 (1948).
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around "derogations" from basic human rights has grown up reflecting this
fact.18
These characteristics of this immediate post-war wave 9 of human
rights development, designed to copper-fasten democracy from both right-
and (more to the point) left-wing attack, have been followed up in most of
the domestic bills of rights that have been incorporated into the national
arrangements of old and newly emerging (that is, post-colonial) states from
the 1950s onwards. Civil and political rights--civil liberties-are given
positive protection, but not as absolute entitlements: their protection must
yield both in individual cases from time to time (where the one who deploys
such freedom must be controlled in the interests of democracy) and also
more generally in periods of acute political tension (a situation of public
emergency). The explosion of rights talk that has followed the end of the
Cold War reflects the beacon-like quality of this language as a repository
of many of our better feelings about our fellow humans in an increasingly
competitive world.2' Its force has threatened to swamp more traditional
discourses within it, such as that which has been under scrutiny in this
article. Does the language of civil liberties gain from having been so
enmeshed in this new human rights metaphor?
At one level, the constitutionalization of civil liberties protection in
human rights charters and domestic bills of rights has clearly provided
added protection for civil liberties. The old problem of a properly elected
legislature choosing to attack civil liberties (a case of the democratic child
biting the hand that feeds it its legitimacy) has always been a real one. It is
a variant of the means/ends dilemma that is inherent in every democrat's
determination to see a fully-sovereign legislature in place-the definition
of success is that there is no ready means of controlling what the elected
assembly chooses to do. Locating civil liberties in a constitutional code that
oversees such legislatures may diminish the sovereign purity of the latter,
but it does at least give civil liberties a fighting chance of surviving, even in
the teeth of some whipped-up (or genuine) popular anger. There is plenty
of evidence of the existence of such charters, codes, and bills of rights
having had a disciplinary effect on the way that legislatures have
18 A.W.B. Simpson, Human Rights and the End of the Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the
European Convention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Jaime Orag, Human Rights in States of
Emergency in International Law (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1992).
19 Francesca Klug, Values for a Godless Age: The Story of the UK's New Bill of Rights (London:
Penguin Books, 2000).
20 But for a critical appraisal of the trend, see Kristin Sellars, The Rise and Rise of Human Rights
(Stroud: Sutton, 2002); Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1999).
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approached the limiting of civil liberties within the jurisdictions for which
they are responsible. 21 The more courts charged with the enforcement of
such documents come to regard civil liberties as important, the more a
fighting chance of their survival increases. And as suggested above, the old
paradigm of a class-based judicial branch wholly immune to the necessity
of protecting political activists outside the ruling elite no longer holds good,
at least not to the same extent as in the past.2
On the other hand, the constitutionalization of civil liberties has
proved less secure than might have been imagined. First, there are certain
disadvantages in being caught up in a fungible kind of way in the ever-
growing and ever-more-unwieldy basket of human rights. While it is
perfectly true that the initial focus in the early international and domestic
documents on human rights was on civil and political rights, the subject has
greatly expanded since then, and the insights in the Universal Declaration
about what it means to be human have been translated into further
documents (at both the international and domestic levels) that deal with a
far wider range of subjects than civil liberties.2Y Indeed, the extent of
international human rights is now such that it presents a full and, to the
social democrat, very pleasing account of how life should be, but it cannot
by any stretch be described as politically uncontroversial, even in
democratic systems of government of the best sort and particularly not
where the openness of the electoral system has permitted the rise of
authoritarian proponents of liberal capitalism. It has surely been quite
proper to develop international law as a cutting edge in the changing of
attitudes to equality, discrimination, poverty, and the abuses of minority
groups across the world, but this forging ahead has left civil liberties looking
like just a few freedoms among the many, with no special or different call
on our attention.
Second, and following from this first point, in its (to this author at
least) laudable drive to improve the lot of humanity, international human
2) For a European and U.K. perspective on this issue see C.A. Gearty, "Civil Liberties and Human
Rights" in Peter Leyland & Nick Bamforth, eds., The Contemporary Constitution (Oxford: Hart)
[forthcoming in 2003].
22 A trend assisted in some jurisdictions by reforms to the process of judicial appointment. For an
update on the fast-moving U.K. position, where a range of proposals for radical change have been
made, see The Department of Constitutional Affairs, online: <http://www.lcd.gov.uk/> (date accessed:
21 July 2003).
23 See generally Ian Brownlie & Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Basic Documents on Human Rights 4th ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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rights law has left the idea of democracy in its slipstream.24 To the activist
human rights lawyer, the nation state often seems to stand in the way of
progress, to act as a barrier between the progressive ideas of human rights
and the people these ideas are meant to serve. This is the case whether or
not the representatives of such places are democratically elected. Of course,
the more democratic a state, the more likely the government is to engage
properly and fairly with the proponents of international human rights, but
despite this convergence, the relationship remains an adversarial one, at
least to some extent. Meanwhile, international law has provided no
alternative democratic framework to facilitate the development of human
rights standards, to rein in the international human rights activists where
necessary, or to ensure the effective enforcement of the codes of rights that
are agreed, properly connecting them (if need be) to democratic judgments
about resources. The lack of this international democratic culture, allied to
the habit of seeing national governments as standing in the way of change,
has caused the international human rights lawyer to be less inclined to see
that civil and political rights are as important as they were once believed to
be. These rights are about consolidating democracy, but what good has
democracy been in delivering the outcomes in which the proponents of
international human rights profoundly believe? This division between
human rights and civil and political rights has been to the marked
disadvantage of the latter.
Third, there is the problem of the capacity for override available in
most human rights charters that incorporate civil liberties within their
remit. Exceptions and derogations can be made to human rights, the focus
of which will usually be on civil and political rights rather than on other
social and economic entitlements since it is to the limitation of the former
that a state, even a democratic one, will usually look when trying (or
asserting that it is trying) to defend itself. It is true that the relevant
international and domestic documents usually provide an appropriately
restrictive framework for the operation of exceptions to, and derogations
from, fundamental human rights: there is much talk in the documents and
the case law of necessity, a proportionately "pressing social need," and the
like. All this is excellent in that it disciplines the state authorities minded
to depart from civil liberties to think before doing so. Nonetheless, certain
24
,,Democracy used to be a word that international legal commentators preferred to avoid": Susan
Marks, "The End of History? Reflections on Some International Legal Theses" (1997) 8 E.J.I.L. 449.
The "used to" here attests to some progress in the area, evidenced by the material covered in Marks'
piece. See generally the work of Thomas Franck, especially his "The Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance" (1992) 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 46.
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disadvantages inevitably flow from the existence of such suspensory
opportunities in human rights charters.
First, the very availability to the state of a course of conduct that
can ignore (or greatly reduce) respect for civil liberties puts before the
executive authorities an option for action that would previously have been
unthinkable, there having been no words previously available to describe
it: a wholesale departure from civil liberties without recourse to primary,
democratically-rooted legislation to mandate such action. The override
clauses contained in typical human rights charters can, in most states, be
actualized without proper democratic accountability. Having been offered
a button marked "self-destruct," it would be surprising if
governments--even non-malicious ones-did not occasionally succumb to
the temptation to press it. This is especially so in the atmosphere after 9/11,
and has already produced a derogation in the United Kingdom. Where
legislation restrictive of civil liberties is promoted, often in tandem with the
declaration of such states of emergency, this constitutional language of
crisis and national security provides a ready shorthand for draconian action:
witness the range of repressive initiatives taken in the aftermath of 9/11 in
countries with theoretically impeccable bills of rights. We can only guess at
what might have happened in the United States if the drafters of that
country's Bill of Rights had thought to put in it an emergency override
clause.2
Second, there is the problem of the fragility of the linguistic
safeguards built into the exception and derogation clauses in the typical
human rights document. As noted above, the controlling words may read
impressively, but the reality is that the judicial arm given the responsibility
of overseeing their application, whether international or national, will
invariably-and perhaps even (in democratic terms) rightly-accord the
executive a high degree of latitude in its judgment as to what is required to
protect the state. The point is attested to in case law from across the
world. 26 Even the absolutist guarantees of the U.S. Bill of Rights have been
shown not to be what they seem when interpreted by the judges in light of
war or war-like domestic circumstances.27 Save in wholly exceptional
circumstances, judicial challenges to derogations from, and exceptions to,
civil and political rights made in the name of national security usually end
25 For a taste of the implications for civil rights, due process of the changes in legislation, and in
the political climate generally in the United States, see the reports of the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, supra note 14, and Al Odah v. United States, 321 F. 3d 1134 (2003) (C.A. D.C.).
26 See in the United Kingdom, A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] EWCA Civ
1502.
27 A well-known example is Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (S.D. N.Y.).
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in failure.' This is the case even in those jurisdictions where the
contemporary judicial fashion is for careful protection of civil liberties.
Human rights may be a trump in the pack of political cards, but the
interests of national security is the trump of trumps, carrying all before it.
Third, and following from the second point, there is the problem of
legitimization. An attack on civil liberties that takes place baldly, either
extra-legally or via legislation designed for just this purpose, has at least the
virtue of being out in the open, and, therefore, being clear for all to see. 29
Of course, there is still debate about the nature of the attack, how serious
it is, and whether it is justifiable, but the discussion is at least framed in the
appropriate way. But a restriction of civil liberties that takes place within
the framework of a human rights document (either a "necessary" exception
to free speech, for example, or an action to counter a "public emergency")
can be presented as not an attack at all, but rather as an action mandated
by the state's commitment to human rights. Far from infringing human
rights, the repression is (fully) compatible with them. This legitimization of
what might have been considered by the naive to be an attack on civil
liberties then draws added strength from the (almost inevitable) judicial
decision upholding the emergency action as valid, that is, in accord with
human rights standards. So internment, censorship, proscription, and the
like are consistent with rather than departures from human rights standards.
The repressive state can deepen its reactionary engagement with domestic
political dissent while all the time asserting confidently and (in legal terms)
correctly that it is respecting human rights standards. Most members of the
population do not notice the shrinking of the political marketplace of ideas,
or, if they do, they can be assured that the protestors they see being
dragged away from the shopping mall,a° the internees whom they read
about being locked up without charge for years on end,a" or the
organizations they find it is no longer lawful to join 2 are actually all being
dealt with in a way that is in perfect harmony with "the very best human
rights standards," a fact attested to by all the "human rights experts." And
it is not impossible to imagine that torture, called by another name of
28 An important European Court of Human Rights example is Brannigan v. United Kingdom
(1993), 17 E.H.R.R. 539.
29 Where the action is truly heinous, there may be difficulties of detection of course, but "out in
the open" means here self-evidently a departure from civil liberties standards.
30 Appleby v. United Kingdom (6 May 2003), Strasbourg (Eur. Ct. H.R), online:
http:/Ihudoc.echr.coe.int/Hudocldoc2/HEJUD/200305/appleby%2et%2Oal.%20-%2044306jnv.chb
4%2006052003e.doc (date accessed: 28 July 2003).
31 Supra note 26.
32 O'Driscoll v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] EWHC 2477 (Admin).
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course, and surrounded by judicial safeguards (at least initially), could fit
itself neatly into this new human rights paradigm.
V. THE PROBLEM ADDRESSED
We end where we started with the problem of language. Just as in
1984 the Ministries of Peace and Love meant war and internal security, 3  so
today we have departments of defence engaging in hostile action abroad,
and a set of guaranteed human rights to underpin internal repression at
home. Of course, the point is exaggerated, but with our political language
changing at such speed and with so vast a power as the United States
seemingly engaged in reshaping our understanding of what democracy
means (both internally and externally), who can be so sure that the next
longish resting place for the language that governs our social organization
might not be along these lines? The battleground over which our next bit
of this part of human history is being fought is the field demarcated
"democracy" and it is to the patch in that area marked "civil liberties" that
we need now to return. Proponents of the current drift away from
traditional assumptions about what democracy and civil liberties mean are
vocally scathing of the sectionalism, the lack of realism, and the self-
interestedness of the civil liberties lobby. Defenders of political freedom
counter with assertions about the importance of democracy and the need
to respect our traditional liberties. Who is likely to emerge victoriously
from this conflict?
At the moment it is no contest. Governments hold all of the cards,
including a full set of both suits of trumps. Behind them, largely
unaccountable and sometimes entirely secret, security organizations feed
their democratic leaders chilling stories of imminent terrorism and easily
usable weapons of mass destruction. These horrifying narratives are then
passed on to the wider electorate shrouded in mystery and (more to the
point) always (the issues being so sensitive) scantily dressed so far as any
detail is concerned. Democratic cultures play their part in maintaining this
atmosphere of fear, often whipping it up voluntarily, sometimes fabricating
dramatic versions of the truth out of information supplied by the security
state.a4 The intellectual community is even developing some momentum
behind a radical critique of the whole idea of democracy, with authors
beginning to stress-to the widespread praise of distinguished
33 George Orwell, 1984 (London: Penguin Books, 1989).
34 On the media, see Arundhati Roy, "The Ordinary Person's Guide to Empire" In These Times
27:12 (26 May 2003) 17.
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colleagues-the inconvenience and disadvantage of traditional ideas of
representativeness and accountability. 35 At the very least, the content of
what is meant by democracy is under scrutiny, with the substantive
understanding that emphasizes U.S.-style freedom gradually supplanting
the traditional, process-based commitment to free elections and the
sovereignty of the people that used to be what the idea of representative
democracy entailed.
Against these forces are ranged a puny alliance of intellectuals,
liberals, lawyers, and dissidents who are not even clear about what they
mean by civil liberties. The fashion of postmodernism does not help here,
with its distaste for objective meaning and its reluctance to commit itself to
any true sense of right and wrong. As the influential philosopher Richard
Rorty has remarked, it is "central to the idea of a liberal society that, in
respect to words as opposed to deeds, persuasion as opposed to force,
anything goes.' '3 6 It follows that a "liberal society is one which is content to
call 'true' whatever the upshot of such encounters [as between openminded
forces] turns out to be."37 The various governments in power in the liberal
democracies of the world have set about such a redescription with gusto
since 9/11, though whether any true-blooded liberal or even Rorty's liberal
ironist would regard it as an improvement is not so much an open as a
rhetorical question, destined to elicit an automatic negative.
The winners in this unequal battle of the labels should not be called
right merely because they have won, or are winning. Such passivity ill-suits
the civil libertarian Left, which forged its identity in action, often against
seemingly hopeless odds. It is not inevitable that Rorty and his fellow
ironists are right and there is nothing worth fighting for out there, beyond
words: modified forms of foundationalism that demand that there is still
space for democracy, civil liberties, and human rights remain available for
use by those temperamentally so inclined, and these perspectives fit such
activists better than the jaded "know-all/know nothing" superiority of the
postmodern scholar.38 But even if Rorty and his school are right, then we
nevertheless owe it to past generations of fighters and activists who
struggled for democracy and civil liberties, often dying for these causes, or
35See Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad 1st ed.
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), reviewed by Niall Ferguson, "Overdoing democracy" in The New York
Times Book Review (13 April 2003) 9.
36 Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) at 51-52.
37 lbii at 52 [emphasis in original].
38 Particularly good are Habermas, supra note 1 at 113-29, and Steven Lukes, "Five Fables about
Human Rights" in Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley, eds., On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty
Lectures, 1993 (New York: Basic Books, 1993) 19.
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being imprisoned, or treated harshly for holding fast to their convictions,
not to forsake their world view without so much as a murmur of dissent.
Even the flightiest of language tricksters appreciates the power of the idea
of solidarity, and if all we had left was a sense of solidarity with the brave
democratic souls of the past who have made us what we are, then that
should be enough to energize a fight back.
What is to be done? Firstly, there is some intellectual pruning that
is urgently needed. The branches on the tree of (civil) liberty marked
"criminal justice," "prisoners' rights," "civil actions against the police," and
so on need to be lopped off and sent across to other discourses. Civil liberty
is not about the length of a criminal sentence, the state of a country's jails,
or whether a victim should be compensated for alleged police brutality.
These are important issues to be sure, but they belong elsewhere, and the
controversy that surrounds them has confused the subject of civil liberties
and debilitated its capacity to communicate its message.a9 The core of the
subject lies in the protection of political freedom. Civil liberties is
concerned with making representative democracy work. Its perspective on
the world idealizes the arrangement of our public space in a way desired by
the people within that space, with each being accorded equality of respect
so far as their choice is concerned. Thus, civil liberties is about securing free
and fair elections and ensuring that wealth does not dominate such
elections. It is also about ensuring that the political atmosphere around
such elections, and in society generally, is free and open with all views being
able to be heard, even if not believed. Though once invariably wedded to
a particular outcome (socialism), today's civil libertarians are committed to
the process rather than to what it is likely to deliver; they may have private
opinions on the latter, but these do not make them more or less civil
libertarian in their perspective.
Secondly, having sharpened the remit of the subject, adherents to
it should go on the attack. They should challenge current assumptions
about the national security state, hold conferences in which they propose
change-on campaign funding, on media ownership, on political
speech-rather than merely react defensively to the latest piece of
aggressive speculation by the post-democratic liberal extremists. A broad
front should be possible, from the unions concerned about freedom of
association on the Left to nostalgic civil libertarians on the Right. The need
to redress the international law presumption away from democracy and
towards human rights should preoccupy the modern civil libertarian whose
39 For an original and penetrating analysis of the field of criminal justice see Andrew Ashworth,
Human Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002).
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energies should be as sharply focused on the global as on the local.40 Politics
is certain to present flashpoints around which mass campaigns can be built,
the purpose of which should be to reinculcate into the wider public some
grasp of the importance of freedom and civil liberties. The consciousness-
raising that occurred before and during the Anglo-American attack on Iraq
in the spring of 2003 might, with care, be extrapolated into a broader
political agenda. The requirement for an explicit renewal of anti-terrorism
laws in the United Kingdom provides an opportunity for critical
engagement with the national security state.4' The U.S. Senate has already
had to back down from making permanent "the sweeping antiterrorism
powers" in the 2001 Act, though this is seen by informed observers as a
retreat that "clears [the] way for [a] new bill. 42 Nevertheless, there is still
a fight out there to be had: the atmosphere in the United States may be
bleak, but it is not (yet) so awful that a debate cannot even be had.
Finally, the advocates of civil liberties need to grit their teeth and
remember afresh some of the techniques of political campaigning that they
have forgotten and that their opponents have mastered in recent years.
Civil libertarian campaigners need to relearn the virtues of patience and
focus, and to remind themselves of the importance of such traditional
socialist values as fraternity and solidarity. They need to reach out to the
wider community, and use techniques of communication that connect with
this audience and that are not to be sniffed at merely because they were not
used in generations gone by. Advertising and branding need not be the
exclusive weapons of the anti-civil libertarians, nor should money be on one
side only. The aim should be for a scholarly reassertion of what civil
liberties mean and why democracy matters, which can then be focused on
particular political campaigns. These movements would then be able to
draw support from a global coalition of civil libertarian-minded citizens
fully aware of the intellectual underpinnings of what they were arguing for.
A link between the scholar, the liberal lawyer, and the trade unions seems
vital here. If properly funded, such a campaign would be able to enjoy the
benefits of modern techniques of communication and marketing. This does
not require a single movement, but it does suggest more coordination than
40 See Harry Shutt, A New Democracy: Alternatives to a Bankrupt World Order (London: Zed
Books, 2001); Alison Brysk, Globalization and Human Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2002); Tim Dunne & Nicholas J. Wheeler, Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999).
The committee of privy counsellors charged with reviewing the 2001 Act is expected to report
by the end of the year.
42 Eric Lichtblau, "Aftereffects: Surveillance, G.O.P. Makes Deal in Senate to Widen Antiterror
Power" New York Times (9 May 2003) 1.
20031
210 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL.41, NOS. 2 & 3
is at present to be found; anarchy remains as attractive as it has always
been, and just as futile. If the democratic and civil libertarian agenda is in
place and working, the outcomes-fairness, justice, and equality of
opportunity for all-will come over time.
